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I. THE CHOICE: To FORGET OR TO ESTABLISH THE TRUTH,
TO PARDON OR TO PUNISH
The importance of a reliable justice system and the rule of law is
universally accepted. Nonetheless, controversy still surrounds the extent to
which seeking justice for past war crimes and grave human rights abuses
represents a precondition for-or an impediment to-the overall stability of
post-conflict and transitional societies. Human rights advocates tend to regard
the implementation of judicial norms and institutions as an omnipotent cure
against war crimes and human rights abuses; diplomats and other peacemakers
are far more skeptical, sometimes regarding justice as mere window-dressing
or, worse, as a direct impediment to peace.' Actual experience does not
provide straightforward answers. Different societies have taken different paths
to confront post-conflict and transition challenges-and have met with both
success and shortcomings. Moreover "simple" transitions from a repressive
regime to democracy (such as in Argentina, Chile, or El Salvador) should be
distinguished from transitions following patterns of atrocity that had racial,
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1. See, e.g., PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR CRIMES
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religious, or ethnic underpinnings (such as in South Africa, Rwanda,
Guatemala, or Bosnia and Herzegovina).' This variety, however, should not
discourage the international community from trying to identify possible
patterns; to the contrary, richness of experience, if systemized, can illustrate
more clearly the current state of international justice and, possibly, where it is
going.'
This Comment will first attempt to catalogue the various attitudes of
post-conflict societies and their corresponding types of reaction to past war
crimes and human rights abuses. The objective is to identify trends in an
attempt to learn from experience. The underlying framework will be slightly
simplified in order to illustrate the trends more clearly. References to
experience will also serve as reminders of the real world complexity and the
inherent difficulties in formulating any general conclusions.
This Comment portrays both attitudes and reactions toward past war
crimes and human rights abuses as choices between the following options:
forgetting or establishing the truth, and pardoning or punishing the
perpetrators. These options can be presented graphically, with each as the
endpoint of a continuum. Every experience of a society that has dealt with
past war crimes and human rights abuses can be located somewhere within
such a framework and compared against other experiences.
FIGURE 1. ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS TOWARD PAST WAR CRIMES AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: CHOICES
To Pardon the Perpetrators
To Forget To Establish
the Past the Truth
To Punish the Perpetrators
2. On the types of different experiences of societies facing past war crimes and human rights
abuses, see Neil J. Kritz, Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview of Developments in the
Search for Justice and Reconciliation, in THE LEGACY OF ABUSE-CONFRONTING THE PAST, FACING THE
FUTURE 21 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 2002), http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/vap02/ [hereinafter THE LEGACY
OF ABUSE].
3. The increased interest in transitional justice is encouraging in this respect. From 1970 to
1989, approximately 150 books, chapters, and articles were published on this topic, while the 1990s
alone produced more than 1,000 such publications. Id. at 22.
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II. ATTITUDES TOWARD PAST WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
The analysis begins with attitudes. Attitudes cannot be directly
observed; rather, they can be identified only on the basis of various indicators.
Individuals, societies, and various international actors can-and usually do-
have different attitudes toward past war crimes and human rights abuses. Of
course, the most interesting are the prevailing attitudes-the ones that are
supported by the dominant political forces within the post-conflict or
transitional society itself. Four basic attitudes correspond to the different
possible combinations of responses to the choices just described-to forget or
to establish truth; to punish or to pardon:'
(1) "Willful ignorance"-to forget and to pardon;
(2) "Historical record"-to establish the truth, but to pardon;
(3) "Pragmatic retribution"--to forget, but still punish; and
(4) "No peace without justice"-to establish the truth and to punish the
perpetrators.
The relationship between choices and attitudes is clear when presented
graphically.





To Forget To Establish
the Truth
Pragmatic No PeacePragatic Without
Retribution JusticeJustice
To Punish
Each of the attitudes can be traced back to certain identifiable motives,
as illustrated by some historical examples. The desire for "willful ignorance"
4. These four attitudes represent extremes, or perfect types. Any number of additional
attitudes might exist along each continuum. Analyzing the myriad of attitudes that represent a
combination of these four basic elements is beyond the scope of this comment.
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derives from a perception that past experience is so controversial, divisive,
and painful as to merit being forgotten-being cast into oblivion. This may
also be the opportunistic position taken by a politically important group
seeking to hide its responsibility for past events. In either case, this attitude
reflects an attempt to cut off the divisive past in a single instant, looking only
to the future. A typical moral justification for such an attitude is the idea that
any solution that prevents human suffering and can bring about an immediate
peace is a good one.
The July 1999 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (Lomd Peace
Agreement), designed to stop the civil war in Sierra Leone, provides a recent
example of the "willful ignorance" approach.5 In an attempt to end the
hostilities and brutalities that had characterized the conflict, the agreement
brought representatives of rebel forces, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
led by Foday Sankoh, into the national government. It provided for a postwar
power-sharing arrangement and a sweeping general amnesty.6
By contrast, the search to establish the "historical record" is motivated
by the belief that in spite of the desire to facilitate reconciliation by pardoning
the perpetrators of abuse, knowing and recording the events that have taken
place is essential to avoid their repetition. Some also contend that revealing
the truth provides symbolic satisfaction to the victims. This attitude may be
honestly held and well-intentioned, but it may also represent a compromise
between former abusers and their victims, who settle for the limited
satisfaction of truth, rather than receive actual redress through punishment.
Post-apartheid South Africa, which granted amnesty in exchange for
testimony regarding major crimes of the apartheid era, represents the
"historical record" attitude. Instead of a blanket amnesty, a conditional
amnesty was offered. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission received
more than 7,000 amnesty applications, and the program is considered to have
succeeded in establishing a complete, year-to-year record and analysis of the
abuses committed under apartheid.7
"Pragmatic retribution" is motivated by the will to get rid of the abusers
fast, but without raising controversial issues from the past. From this
perspective, pragmatism is more important than justice. It is considered
essential to eliminate the perpetrators of abuses from political life by either
taking administrative measures to exclude them or by punishing them for
crimes that are not directly tied to war crimes and abuses, and, therefore, not
politically divisive.
5. Letter Dated 12 July 1999 from the Charg d'Affaires Ad Interim of the Permanent
Mission of Togo to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex: Peace
Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777 (1999), http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html [hereinafter Lom6
Peace Agreement].
6. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 5, art. IX. See also infra notes 22-23.
7. For a more detailed account of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
see Brandon Hamber, Dealing with the Past: Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in
South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1074, 1075-87 (2003).
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In general, the Central and Eastern European transitions from
communist rule in the late 1980s and early 1990s were not accompanied by a
large number of prosecutions.' There were virtually no criminal proceedings,
although states often took some administrative measures to limit the political
participation of alleged former abusers. Even the rare criminal proceedings
tended to be limited to non-controversial issues. For example, when the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 9 indicted former President Slobodan
Milogevi6, the prosecution was to be for corruption and arranging the murder
of a political opponent, not for the Serbian genocide or war crimes against
Croatians, Muslims, and Albanians.' I
Finally, those who take the "no peace without justice" approach are
motivated by the belief that only legal proceedings against the perpetrators of
war crimes and human rights abuses can: (1) provide the truth and punishment
necessary to satisfy the victims; (2) prevent individual retaliation for past
injustices; and (3) prevent history from repeating itself. Victims and human
rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) typically adopt this position,
but it can also become the dominant attitude of a post-conflict society, or even
of the international community in particular situations. For example, the new
government of Rwanda took a strong position that the genocide of up to one
million people in 1994 required punishment through criminal justice. In fact,
however, justice has proven very difficult to achieve. The ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha has only been able to deal
with a few dozen cases, leaving some 125,000 detainees to be processed by
the weak national judicial system. This inundation has forced the government
of Rwanda to adopt new practical solutions-such as local community
courts-for some detainees who confess to their involvement in the
atrocities."
III. TYPES OF REACTION TOWARD PAST WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES
Interpreting the attitudes of different post-conflict and transition
societies is an inexact science that requires the identification of various
8. The trials of border guards in the former East Germany were exceptions. See Kritz, supra
note 2, at 26.
9. On February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia formally changed its name to
Serbia and Montenegro. See Daniel Simpson, Yugoslavia Is Again Reinvented, in Name and Structure,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A3.
10. Milo~evid is being prosecuted for those crimes, however, by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. On the trial against Milogevid, see, generally,
MICHAEL P. SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIt ON TRIAL: A COMPANION (2002).
11. Because it would have taken many decades for the ICTR or national courts to process the
high number of cases, it became necessary to adopt a pragmatic approach. Confessions have been
encouraged in exchange for reduced sentences, and lesser offenders have been moved to a new, village-
based community justice system called gacaca, which has loose roots in an indigenous model of
traditional justice. See Rwanda: Genocide Suspects Wo Confess To Go Free, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2004, at A9. On the role ofgacaca in adapting a new approach to reaching a legal settlement for the
genocide, see NORWEGIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: THE GACACA
SYSTEM AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 18-23, 32-33 (2002),
http://www.nhc.no/land/rwanda/Rwanda.pdf. This approach may not satisfy the highest international
standards, but there is probably no realistic alternative. See Kritz, supra note 2, at 3 1.
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indicators. Reactions, however, usually take some kind of legal form and can
be more easily identified. A typology of four basic forms of reaction toward
past war crimes and human rights abuses corresponds to the set of societal
choices identified above-to forget or establish the truth; to pardon or punish
the guilty: 2
(1) Amnesty-to forget and to pardon;
(2) Truth commissions-to establish the truth, but to pardon;
(3) Lustration or substitute criminal charges-to forget and to punish;
(4) Individual or collective criminal justice proceedings-to establish the
truth and to punish.
The relationship between the different choices and reaction forms can
also be presented graphically.






To Forget the Truth





Amnesty reflects the highest level of commitment to the "willful
ignorance" response. It can be a blanket amnesty-anonymous, en masse,
with no conditions and no questions asked. Blanket amnesties were routinely
accepted during the transitions in Latin America, with the exception of
Argentina. 11 Alternatively, a conditional or individual amnesty can be
12. Just as is the case with attitudes, many different types of reaction-perhaps combining the
forms identified here-exist in the real world. This Comment seeks only to address these four basic
reactions.
13. Argentina initially undertook prosecutions of those responsible for human rights abuses
during the preceding military dictatorship, but after a year it gave up under military pressure. See Kritz,
supra note 2, at 25, 32-33. Argentina's experience influenced subsequent Latin American political
transitions, which predominantly featured blanket amnesties and the absence of criminal proceedings.
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established, covering the majority of crimes in exchange for cooperation in
establishing full truth about the past (as offered in South Africa). A typical
means of proclaiming an amnesty is to pass an amnesty law with retroactive
effect.
Truth commissions reflect a high level of commitment to establishing
the truth, but also a willingness to pardon the offenders. Establishing a reliable
historical record can be important because past abuses can be systematically
hidden (as in the case of disappeared persons in Latin America), or because
different sides to the conflict may offer competing and conflicting versions of
the "truth" about past events. In any case, truth commissions offer at least the
possibility of symbolic satisfaction for the victims and can help mitigate the
risks of future conflict.
Lustration or the use of substitute criminal charges reflects the desire to
simultaneously and avoid the risks related to establishing the truth to punish
the perpetrators in some way. During the communist era, many people in
Eastern Europe were, in one way or another, involved in human rights abuses
(e.g., as political police informants), but it was considered deeply problematic
to put them all on trial after the regimes fell. Instead, through the process of
lustration they were excluded from active political life and prohibited from
participating in public administration (especially positions with the military or
police). Decisions were made based on the review of secret police records and
followed by the elimination of former collaborators. These techniques were
not limited to the former communist countries. For example, the review
conduct by an ad hoc commission established in El Salvador has
recommended that one hundred senior military officers be retired on the basis
of their involvement in past human rights abuses."
As for substitute criminal charges, take the case of Slobodan Milogevi6,
the former President of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The
government of Serbia indicted and had intended to arrest Milogevid on
corruption and political assassination charges-not for his involvement in
genocide and war crimes. In cases of both lustration and the use of substitute
criminal charges, the establishment of truth is avoided for political reasons.
Substitute criminal charges impose a higher degree of punishment than
lustration; they not only place restrictions on participation in public life or
administration, but they also involve actual imprisonment of the convicted
person. Lustration requires some legal determination of the scope of persons
affected and the extent of consequences for those individuals; legal
institutions are designated to perform the process. Substitute criminal charges
do not require any changes to the legal system; existing rules and institutions
are used to punish and remove the accused individuals from public life.
Finally, reaction can take the form of any number of complex
proceedings based on the pursuit of individual or collective responsibility.
These trial-based proceedings combine a strong demand for establishing the
truth with a desire to mete out either collective or individual punishment
against the perpetrators. Proceedings focused on collective responsibility
14. Id. at 36.
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represent a form of reaction targeting a collective body considered responsible
for the abuse of victims who are entitled to compensation. For example, some
companies have recently paid reparations to individuals who worked as forced
laborers during the Second World War. These claims are somewhat similar to
claims for war reparations, such as those brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina
as well as Croatia against Serbia and Montenegro for alleged genocide; the
claims are currently pending before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 15
Collective responsibility can be regulated through various legal institutions,
but its basis is the awarding of compensation.
Proceedings focused on individual criminal responsibility represent a
form of reaction oriented toward both establishing the truth and punishing the
individual criminal perpetrators. Responsibility can be established through
national proceedings; through courts in third countries that exercise universal
jurisdiction; through proceedings before ad hoc tribunals, such as those for the
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda; through hybrid tribunals involving a mix
of national and international judges and prosecutors, such as those in Sierra
Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo; or before the International Criminal Court
(ICC). The laws regulating individual criminal responsibility are contained in
national criminal codes, international criminal law, and the statutes of ad hoc
tribunals or the ICC.
IV. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND TYPES OF REACTION
Each of the four basic attitudes to past war crimes and human rights
abuses described in Part II corresponds to a certain form of reaction described
in Part III:
(1) "Willful ignorance" corresponds to amnesty;
(2) "Historical record" corresponds to truth commissions;
(3) "Pragmatic retribution" corresponds to lustration or substitute criminal
charges; and
(4) "No peace without justice" corresponds to proceedings based on
individual or collective responsibility.
These relationships between attitudes and their corresponding types of
reaction can also be presented graphically.
15. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) I.C.J. (Mar. 20, 1993) para. 135(r),
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyframeihtm; Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb. & Mont.) I.C.J. (July 2, 1999),
para. 36(b), http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/icry/icry_orders/icry-iapplication-1990702.pdf. If the
claimants are successful in these proceedings, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will (among other
sanctions) be obliged to pay compensation related to the genocide. The author of this Comment is the
Agent for the Republic of Croatia in the ICJ proceedings.
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FIGURE 4. ATTITUDES AND TYPES OF REACTION
TOWARD PAST WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
To Pardon
















If the attitude toward past war crimes and human rights abuses is
"willful ignorance," then the suitable form of reaction is amnesty. A
willingness to forget and to pardon is reflected in amnesty's grant of immunity
from prosecution. The past is buried, for better or worse, and perpetrators of at
least some crimes and human rights abuses get a legal waiver from
prosecution. Amnesty can increase stability by eliminating the uncertainty
surrounding the potential prosecutions-or their potential misuse. Its
shortcoming is the potential frustration of the victims-possibly providing the
motivation to seek individual revenge. Furthermore, crimes or abuses might
reoccur because they were neither symbolically condemned nor individually
or collectively punished.
If the attitude is "historical record," truth commissions represent a
suitable form of reaction. This instrument enables the establishment of the
truth-often with far reaching political impact-but without punishing the
perpetrators (or at least certain categories of the perpetrators), thus meeting
the two goals of those who prioritize the historical record. The benefits
provided by truth commissions include the opportunity to face the past, to
identify both the victims and the perpetrators, and, in this way, to provide
some level of protection against similar events in the future. Victims receive
some level of symbolic satisfaction, but without pushing perpetrators too hard
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and risking the reemergence of conflict. The shortcoming of this approach is
that victims who know the truth-but who are also aware that the perpetrators
have not been punished-might be motivated to seek individual revenge.
If the attitude is "pragmatic retribution," then the suitable type of
reaction is lustration or substitute criminal proceedings. The willingness to
eliminate the perpetrators from political life is reflected in their exclusion
from participation in certain sectors of public life-or in the imposition of
individual punishment through criminal proceedings for some measure of
their crimes, which also removes them from the political scene (at least
temporarily). These proceedings, however, avoid rehashing certain
controversies from the past. Instead, war criminals and human rights abusers
are treated as mere common criminals (which, quite often, they also are). This
approach serves to rid society of the most dangerous people without risking
widespread social or political instability. The difficulty is that war crimes or
abuses may reoccur because they were never properly confronted and
condemned in the first instance. Substitute criminal proceedings, however, can
be a good way to prepare the society psychologically for future prosecutions
of more serious and politically sensitive crimes; when it has been established
that a former leader has been engaged in corruption or murder, it is easier to
accept that he or she was a war criminal as well.
If the attitude is "no peace without justice," the appropriate reaction is
proceedings seeking collective or individual responsibility. The willingness to
establish the truth and to punish the perpetrators can be satisfied through a
plethora of legal instruments-primarily courts or tribunals-that can provide
satisfaction to the victims. Society faces the past when perpetrators are
punished on a collective or individual basis. Of course, different proceedings
provide a variety of forms of relief to the victims and pose a variety of threats
to the former abusers. In general, proceedings based on theories of collective
responsibility are less threatening to former abusers precisely because they are
not targeted at any single individual, and because findings of criminal
responsibility give rise to obligations that are most clearly financial, not
moral. On the other hand, financial compensation likely fails to vindicate the
victims' claims as completely as individual prosecutions and punishment
might (although the degree of victim satisfaction could depend on the nature
of the abuses committed or the circumstances of the particular victim).
Proceedings based on individual responsibility provide that benefit, and the
resultant catharsis can help the victims forgive past suffering. Major
drawbacks include the possibility that proceedings against the accused
individuals can take a long period of time (in some cases years), that they
might be misused against political enemies, and that if people who maintain
considerable influence are pushed into a comer, they will fight until the bitter
end.
V. EVOLUTION OF ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES WITH TYPES OF
REACTION
Having catalogued the various possible attitudes and types of reaction
toward past war crimes and human rights abuses on continua between
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forgetting the past and establishing the truth, and between pardoning and
punishing the perpetrators, it becomes possible to identify trends indicating
the possible evolution of attitudes in this context and to analyze a sampling of
the experiences that various types of reaction have produced.
An evolution in attitudes toward past atrocities is clearly connected to
the recognized, more general trend toward greater international pressure to
protect human rights.16 That trend, starting after the Second World War, has
been pushed by the fast development of international human rights law and
the related protection mechanisms and has, in turn, contributed to the
development of national human rights law and protection mechanisms. "
Establishing the truth has come to be seen as an important contributing factor
to achieving sustainable peace and preventing new abuses. In a world with
global media coverage and very active international NGOs, the attitude
favoring "willful ignorance" is becoming increasingly hard to manage or
accept. Instead, there seems to be a clear tendency toward the "no peace
without justice" attitude.
Political developments during the last quarter of a century have further
facilitated the trend. The end of the Cold War reduced the need for tolerating
the "friendly tyrants" whose abuses were previously ignored because of their
importance as allies in a bipolar world. Now that the chances of global, state-
to-state conflict are diminished-and the majority of conflicts take place
locally, within individual states-tolerating war crimes or other grave human
rights abuses has a predominately destabilizing effect on international
security. "
Political immunity-including head-of-state or government immunity-
is also becoming a relic of the past. The prosecution of former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet and indictments by the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia of some government leaders have important
implications for future interpretations of international law. 1" Provisions of the
Rome Statute of the ICC, following the same principle that there is no
immunity for war criminals, regardless of their position, will hopefully have
an important preventive effect.2"
16. On the impact of this trend on state sovereignty, see Ivan Simonovid, State Sovereignty
and Globalization: Are Some States More Equal?, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 3, 381, 384-89, 395-98
(2000).
17. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 1-30 (1995-96); Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of
Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 79-80
(1995-96).
18. Since the end of the Cold War, casualties in intrastate conflicts outnumber those in
interstate conflicts. These "new wars" are nevertheless integrated into global and regional economic
networks. See CHARLES CATER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR AND PEACE 4 (2002),
http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/PublReplnde-body.htm. It is estimated that
approximately 220,000 people died in external conflicts during the 1990s, compared to 3.6 million killed
in internal conflicts. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002:
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 2 (2002).
19. On political and legal aspects of the Pinochet case and its impact, see Jose Zalaquett, The
Pinochet Case: International and Domestic Repercussions, in THE LEGACY OF ABUSE, supra note 2, at
47.
20. Article 27 of the Rome Statute, for example, is clear that official capacity cannot provide
impunity, explicitly mentioning, among others, heads of states and governments. See Rome Statute of
2004]
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The shifting attitude toward truth and punishment has also contributed to
a change in the reaction to past atrocities. Countries have been learning from
each other's experiences. Different types of reaction enable states to establish
the truth without risking destabilization or engaging in individual
prosecutions, to remove perpetrators from public life without raising sensitive
issues, and to hold various proceedings to determine individual or collective
responsibility. However, the widespread inclination toward "no peace without
justice" reflects the ever-increasing emphasis on proceedings based on
individual or collective responsibility. Indeed, it is the diversification and
more frequent use of such proceedings that provide the empirical evidence of
the increasing commitment to pursuing both truth and punishment.
Amnesty seems to be a very useful tool in peace negotiations and post-
conflict peace building and reconciliation, but they should not be utilized to
cover the gravest abuses and war crimes. International humanitarian and
human rights law puts certain limits on the use of amnesties to obtain peace:
states have an international legal obligation to prosecute certain crimes that
they cannot avoid through either political or pragmatic arguments. 2 1 The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) interprets the Geneva
Conventions accordingly,22 and, importantly, the United Nations also has
finally taken a firm stand on this matter.23 It might be easier to negotiate a
peace agreement by including an unlimited amnesty, but the resulting peace
the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
21. If amnesty is granted in a manner that contravenes the relevant international legal
prohibitions on amnesty for certain crimes, perpetrators may still be prosecuted in a third country on the
basis of universal jurisdiction.
22. The ICRC encourages amnesties at the end of hostilities "for those detained or punished
for the mere fact of having participated in hostilities." See Ian Martin, Justice and Reconciliation:
Responsibilities and Dilemmas of Peace-makers and Peace-builders, in THE LEGACY OF ABUSE, supra
note 2, at 81-82. However, taking a firm stand on the necessity of prosecuting war crimes becomes
problematic in messy situations like wartime prisoner exchanges. The ICRC, represented at the meeting
between delegations of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Budapest on
August 8, 1992 by its president, Cornelio Sommaruga, refused to become a co-signatory of the "all for
all" exchange of prisoners agreement, because war crimes trials had already begun and some Croatians
included in the exchange had been sentenced-in some cases to death. The ICRC was aware that those
sentences were the product of large show trials, but it nevertheless did not want to get involved in
potentially sensitive legal issues.
23. As late as 1993-94, the United Nations was involved in encouraging and even drafting a
very broad amnesty agreement for Haiti--covering the war crimes of the military leaders who seized
power in 1991. See id. at 81-82. See also Ian Martin, Haiti: International Force or National
Compromise?, 31 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 711, 733-34 (1999). The turning point in the U.N. position
probably came at the peace agreement for Sierra Leone signed in Lomd in 1999. See Lomd Peace
Agreement, supra note 5. Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front conditioned its signature upon
the grant of the broadest amnesty provisions, which provided "absolute and free pardon to all
combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives." Kritz,
supra note 2, at 33. At the last moment, the U.N. Secretary General's special envoy appended to his
signature a disclaimer to the effect that the amnesty provisions should not apply to international crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. See Martin, supra note 22, at 81-82. In practice, such decisions are often not easy.
The head of the U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (part of Croatia occupied during
the war and slowly reintegrated back into the country U.N. support), Jacques Klein, demanded that
Croatian authorities limit the number of proceedings for war crimes against Serbs from that region in
order to prevent them from fleeing.
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would likely be unsustainable. 24 Conditional and individual amnesty with
retention of the possibility to prosecute the gravest crimes-as was employed
in South Africa-is more fully compatible with both truth commissions and
proceedings based on individual or collective responsibility.
Truth commissions have proven to be powerful instruments in
developing a reliable record of past human rights abuses, but they are also a
means of initiating necessary institutional changes to prevent abuses from
reoccurring. Some evidence indicates that the evolution of truth commissions
has been one of the most important developments in confronting legacies of
past abuses, and that truth commissions have benefited the most from the
process of transnational learning. Burden-sharing reports, established
methodologies, the experiences of staff veterans, and computerized
information from predecessors facilitate the establishment and the work of
each new commission considerably. The various truth commissions (starting
with the first widely known commission, the Argentinean "National
Commission on the Disappeared" in the early 1980s) have had different
prerogatives, roles, composition, and features. Granting an amnesty for
confession (as done by the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission) appears to be a powerful tool for the establishment of a reliable
historical record. In addition, truth commission findings can provide a
powerful source of information on crimes that are not covered by the amnesty.
The inclusion of foreigners in truth commissions, however, has proven to be a
mixed blessing. In situations rife with strong social and political divisions-as
was the case in El Salvador-appointing only foreigners to a truth
commission provided a way to ensure objectivity. However, commissions of
this type invariably produce a historical record that is viewed with some
skepticism by the local population.2' Hybrid commissions that have included
both foreigners and nationals, such as the United Nations Truth Commission
in Guatemala, have represented an attempt to find compromise solutions.
Establishing truth commissions usually requires domestic legislative
intervention to ensure access to evidence and witnesses, and in some cases to
enable commissions to pardon those who are willing to confess to certain
crimes. Truth commissions, with less formal work methods than courts, can
more easily process a large volume of cases, hear more victims, and involve
civil society more deeply. In this way, commissions can help establish
patterns of abuse, analyze the root causes of such abuses, and suggest
institutional reforms to their repetition.26 Even in cases where they do not have
a direct mandate, truth commissions have tended to issue such
recommendations.27 Lustration and substitute criminal charges provide fast
24. The Lomd Peace Agreement and the impunity that it provided ultimately did not bring
lasting peace to Sierra Leone. One hopes the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a special court
will provide for a more sustainable solution.
25. The "outsider quality" of the Commission in El Salvador was the reason for the rejection
of some of its work, even though its report was regarded as generally accurate. See Kritz, supra note 2,
at 39.
26. See Paul van Zyl & Mark Freeman, The Legacy of Abuse: Conference Report, in THE
LEGACY OF ABUSE, supra note 2, at 3, 6.
2004]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:343
and pragmatic solutions to remove war criminals and abusers from public life.
The advantages of lustration are speed and the ability to process a large
number of cases. On the other hand, lustration proceedings have only modest
procedural guarantees of due process of law. Nobody goes to jail, but people
can easily get hurt because of error or political or personal revenge. Like truth
commissions and amnesties, lustration is most useful when combined with
compensation payments to the victims and criminal prosecution of the most
directly responsible perpetrators, conditions permitting. Substitute criminal
charges have practical value if there is a need to move public opinion slowly
toward accepting the personal failings of former high officials. For the sake of
establishing truth and bringing justice to victims, however, substitute criminal
charges should be followed by trials for war crimes and abuses when the
conditions would allow for such trials.
Proceedings based on individual and collective responsibility are rapidly
growing in number and importance and therefore require special attention.
Proceedings based on collective responsibility can make financial
compensation available to victims who will often face very difficult economic
circumstances. This approach provides faster relief for the victims than does
the process of identifying and prosecuting the abusers one by one. 2 The
practical use of collective responsibility measures is limited, however,
because post-conflict and transition societies are usually poor, scarce
resources have to be used strategically to enable recovery, and compensating
the victims is simply not realistic.28 Besides fast compensation for the victims,
proceedings based on collective responsibility can be used for the
establishment of truth and the symbolic satisfaction of the victims, even many
years after the abuses have taken place.29
Although the reactions to past war crimes and human rights abuses
discussed in this Comment have all been developing over several decades,
none has risen to prominence as quickly as proceedings based on individual
criminal responsibility. In post-conflict and transition societies, it is often very
difficult to (re)establish the rule of law-and especially to start that process
with national proceedings for past war crimes and human rights abuses. In
some cases the political will is lacking, while in other cases the justice system
itself has been involved in oppression, infrastructure has been destroyed, or
qualified personnel have been killed or have left the country." Whether the
27. See Martin, supra note 22, at 88-89.
28. See Martin, supra note 22, at 88; Kritz, supra note 2, at 44. Success with compensation
paid to the victims of abuses in Chile can be attributed to a relatively small class of eligible victims and
a good domestic economic situation, and it is therefore difficult to repeat. Id.
29. The German government and German industry have agreed to pay compensation for slave
and forced labor during the Second World War to 900,000 surviving victims. See van Zyl & Freeman,
supra note 26, at 10.
30. See Ivan Simonovid, Post-Conflict Peace Building: The New Trends, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL
INFO. 251, 260-62 (2003). For the rule of law to become a reality, it is necessary to undertake "a
comprehensive approach to building capacity, developing effective safeguards to ensure public
accountability, and forging an enduring partnership between local institutions and the international
community"-a process that includes developing the complete spectrum of necessary components,
including the legal code, judiciary, police, and penal system. See UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE,
LAWLESS RULE VS. RULE OF LAW IN BALKANS (2002), http://www.usip.org/pubs/
specialreports/sr97.html.
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problem is political will, institutional capacity, or both, international
assistance or even more direct involvement is sometimes a precondition to
dealing successfully with the past.3" Foreigners can contribute their skills,
experience, and objectivity, and they can play an important role in achieving
national stability. International involvement also has its costs, however;
international actors use resources that could have been used locally, and there
is the danger of developing of a "culture of dependency" that could threaten
the sustainability of the rule of law when foreign assistance ends.
International processing of war crimes and human rights abuses has been
developing rapidly as well.32 Several hundred years passed between the first
international criminal trial against Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 and the
Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings in the mid-twentieth century, without
much progress in the intervening period. In the last decade, by contrast, this
area of the law has witnessed revolutionary change: the use of universal
jurisdiction has advanced; the U.N. Security Council has established tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda;33 and the international community has
provided expert assistance through hybrid national and international courts to
deal with crimes committed in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo. Finally,
the ICC has been established and saw its first generation of judges elected in
February 2003. 34
Proceedings based on universal jurisdiction represent a powerful tool
against impunity. Ultimately, war criminals and human rights abusers cannot
feel safe, even if their national justice system protects them, or if they have
managed to escape its reach. In recent years, a growing number of national
courts have acted on the basis of universal jurisdiction over crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture to prosecute
foreign perpetrators. 35 However, these proceedings can also create serious
problems if ambitious prosecutors and judges intervene in affairs that they do
not fully understand-with potentially far-reaching political consequences.3 6
31. Levels of foreign involvement may vary "from the light footprint in Afghanistan, through
the ambiguous sovereignty in Kosovo to benevolent despotism in East Timor." SIMON CHESTERMAN,
JUSTICE UNDER INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION: Kosovo, EAST TIMOR AND AFGHANISTAN 13 (2002),
http://www.ipacadmeny.orgfPublications/Reports/PubIRepo Inde-body.htm.
32. For a general overview of the development and contemporary status of international
criminal law, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003) (exploring the rules that
characterize certain conduct as international crimes and describing the international proceedings for their
prosecution and punishment).
33. For comparison between the ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, see
Catherine Cissd, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Some Elements of
Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1997).
34. For the development of international criminal adjudication, see Timothy L.H.
McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 60 ALB. L. REv. 681 (1997); Ivan gimonovi6, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of
International Criminal Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 440 (1999).
35. See Kritz, supra note 2, at 29 (noting "criminal cases in Belgium, Germany, Switzerland,
Austria, Spain, Italy, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Senegal against
foreign nationals alleged to be responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, torture,
disappearances or terrorism in their home countries").
36. Philippe Sands has questioned the wisdom of promoting "an international legal system in
which a judge in one state can issue an indictment against a current minister or leader of another state
that effectively prevents him or her from foreign travel or engaging in other activities associated with his
or her job description." See van Zyl & Freeman, supra note 26, at 8 (describing Sands' position).
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Hypothetically, universal jurisdiction can also be deliberately misused to hurt
political opponents and to at least temporarily prevent them from traveling
abroad.
The establishment of ad hoc international tribunals expressed the
commitment of the international community to establish the truth and to
punish the perpetrators of war crimes and abuses. They have been relatively
successful in helping to establish a reliable historical record through their
proceedings, but sometimes they have had serious difficulties securing the
cooperation of states within their mandate regarding document production,
and especially in bringing high-profile perpetrators to justice. Their work has
also progressed quite slowly, undermining the principle of rapid dispensation
of justice. The work is also extremely expensive, raising doubts about its cost-
effectiveness." The need for translation, foreign judges, complicated logistics,
and highly sophisticated procedural rules (sometimes quite different from
local standards) are objective problems which require time and resources. But
perhaps most worrying is the insufficient impact of the tribunals on the
population of the countries they oversee. Removing proceedings from the
country where the crimes have been committed, and the use of foreign
language and unfamiliar legal rules seems to have contributed to
psychological distance and diminished local media coverage.38 It is shocking
that in spite of all the international efforts, indicted war criminals in the
Tribunal's custody-such as Milo§evi6 and Vojislav egelj-have remained
the leaders of successful political parties in Serbia and Montenegro. 9 National
courts in general have a greater impact on society and its values than
international tribunals. It is typically through national proceedings that
societies confront their own problems and mistakes, and hopefully learn from
them.' In the Republic of Croatia, national proceedings launched against the
37. The yearly allocation for the ICTY and the ICTR for 2002 was about $200 million.
Taking into account the foreseeable duration of the Tribunals (by Security Council Resolution 1503 of
August 28, 2003, investigations should be finished by 2004, trials of first instance by 2008, and appeals
by 2010), the overall expense will be substantial. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 4817th mtg., at 3,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1503 (2003). It is interesting to note that a number of states clearly consider the costs
of these tribunals too high. The issue was informally raised on a number of occasions. It has been noted
that the United Nations and the international community continue to pour hundreds of millions of dollars
into ad hoc tribunals, while failing to invest meaningfully in rebuilding domestic judicial systems. Less
than 30% of member states have paid in full their 2002 Tribunal Assessments. This low number is
particularly striking when compared to regular budget payments, covered in full by 56% of member
states. The fact that a substantial number of states have given priority to the regular budget over the
Tribunals is a strong indicator of their position on the best use of their resources.
38. The ICTR's decision to conduct some of its proceedings in Kigali (Rwanda) instead of
Arusha (Tanzania), where it has its seat, should therefore be welcomed, in spite of numerous logistical
difficulties.
39. Slobodan Milogevid is the former president of Serbia (1989-97) and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (1997-2000). Vojislav etelj is the former deputy prime minister of Serbia and still leads
the Radical Party in Yugoslavia. In spite of the fact that both have been indicted and are being held in
custody at the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, they headed their parties' ballot lists on
the Serbian elections held in 2003. Setelj's party won the most seats in the Parliament. For a breakdown
of the 2003 election results, see Elections in Serbia and Montenegro (Mar. 22, 2004),
http://www.electionworld.org/election/serbiamontenegro.htm.
40. It has been argued, for example, that national proceedings had a much stronger
psychological and moral impact on the population and contributed more to the de-Nazification of
Germany than did Nuremberg or other international trials. See van Zyl & Freeman, supra note 26, at 5.
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young and popular general Mirko Norac-who had substantial military merits
for the Croatian side during the liberation war-for previously unpublicized
crimes, have had a much more sobering effect, and have done much more for
the reestablishment of the rule of law in Croatia than any of the International
Tribunal's proceedings against its citizens.'
Hybrid tribunals, involving both national and international judges and
prosecutors (as in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo) are an attempt at
compromise. The inclusion of local judges makes the work of the court faster
(because they do not face a language barrier and have a stronger
understanding of local laws), and also brings into the proceedings the values,
including political values, of the local judges. In the context of Kosovo, the
"mutiny" of local Albanian judges (and the eventual success of the
movement) in choosing which laws to implement is a striking example." In
hybrid courts, it can be decisive whether local or international judges form a
majority. " For this very reason, after some experimenting, the U.N.
Administrator in Kosovo decided that there should be a majority of
international judges in trials for more serious crimes.
A convincing argument in favor of hybrid courts (or in favor of just
financially strengthening national courts and helping them through mentorship
by foreign legal experts) is the impact of courts established immediately
following the conflict on the sustainability of the justice system in the country
in question." Sooner or later, internationals have to leave and locals have to
take over. Therefore, investment in strengthening the national system seems
critical if long term sustainability is taken into account.
Experiences of the ad hoc tribunals are only a modest contribution in
preparing for the challenges of the International Criminal Court. It will
certainly feature an international composition of judges and prosecutors, its
proceedings will include multiple languages requiring translation, and
proceedings will usually take place far away from the site of the crimes and
abuses. However, the ICC's global character will ensure attention and media
41. General Mirko Norac has been prosecuted and sentenced for his personal involvement in
war crimes. Indictments based exclusively on command responsibility, as the ICTY's indictments often
are, cannot have the same psychological impact as evidence of direct involvement in war crimes. On the
legal problems of command responsibility, see Mirjan Damalka, The Shadow Side of Command
Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (2001).
42. In line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and under strong Russian
pressure, the first regulation issued by the U.N. Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) provided
that applicable law would be the law in force on March 24, 1999 when NATO's air campaign started.
The predominantly Albanian judiciary put in place by UNMIK insisted, however, on applying the
Kosovo Criminal Code and other provincial laws that had been in effect in March 1989, before being
illegally revoked by Belgrade. Under strong pressure, UNMIK finally reversed its decision and passed a
regulation accepting Albanian demands. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 31, at 5.
43. According to a Financial Times report, when international judges sat on a bench with a
majority of Kosovar colleagues, they were always outvoted, because Serbs were automatically regarded
as guilty, while Albanians were rarely condemned. This trend has led to a push for a majority of
internationals. See John Lloyd, We Came Here To Build a State, That's All, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 31,
2002, at 3.
44. Sometimes there will simply have to be trade-offs in terms of higher formal qualifications
of foreigners and a higher level of sustainability provided by early inclusion of locals. For example,
none of the East Timorese has ever served as a judge or a prosecutor under the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
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coverage of its proceedings. The fact that it has global jurisdiction, that it has
been established for future crimes, that its rules have been adopted
consensually and in advance, and that it will assume jurisdiction only when
national justice systems are either unable or unwilling to effectively prosecute,
will certainly contribute to its legitimacy. This legitimacy might facilitate the
International Court's cooperation with national justice systems, but the lack of
full cooperation with ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(established and backed by the power of the U.N. Security Council) and the
reluctance of some countries to accept the ICC's jurisdiction are cause for
concern.
VI. CONCLUSION
Understanding attitudes and types of reaction toward past war crimes
and human rights abuses as basic choices-between whether to forget the past
or to establish the truth, between whether to pardon or punish the
perpetrators-allows us to identify trends which are helpful in creating an
abstract systematization of practical experiences. Increases in the number of
proceedings based on individual or collective responsibility provide empirical
evidence of the increasing importance attached to the establishment of truth
and to the punishment of the perpetrators.
Although there seems to be a shift in attitude toward the establishment
of truth and punishment, there is no set of reaction types toward past war
crimes and human rights abuses, however, that can be generally regarded as
optimal. Approaches to past war crimes and human rights abuses should be
holistic, taking into account various social, legal, political, and moral
dimensions, and the most suitable reaction should take into account questions
of appropriate timing and other specific circumstances. 5 Differentiation of
various types of reaction, knowledge of their strengths and weaknesses, and
flexibility in combining them makes such fine-tuning easier. Practical
experience is being generated all over the world, and it is important to learn
from that experience.
Flexibility in combining various types of reaction can ensure that the
response chosen is prompt and pragmatic, and that justice is finally satisfied.
At least the gravest crimes must be met with criminal proceedings (certus an,
incertus quando). Amnesties, for example, are more and more often reduced
to cover only minor crimes, sometimes conditioning amnesty on cooperation
with truth commissions. Besides establishing the historical record, truth
commissions can help to gather evidence for criminal proceedings. Lustration
or substitute criminal charges can help to remove criminals and abusers from
public life quickly, which does not preclude their criminal prosecution for war
crimes and human rights abuses when the conditions are ready. Proceedings
based on collective responsibility can sometimes provide for the fast
45. Although transitional justice is unavoidably somewhat messy, to ignore past war crimes
and human rights abuses does not seem to be an option anymore. Facing the truth about the past,
satisfying victims, and visiting appropriate consequences upon perpetrators can take various forms, and
each of them and their timing have to be adjusted to each specific situation.
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compensation of the victims, while individual criminal prosecutions of
abusers cannot proceed until the criminals are apprehended and the
evidentiary cases well-developed.
Considering the impact of globalization, and especially the development
of the international protection of human rights, international support for
confronting past injustice in post-conflict and transitional societies is
increasing. Although international involvement in dealing with past war
crimes and abuses is important to guarantee justice for all, it remains crucial
for wounded societies to strengthen their own national justice systems in order
to ensure sustainable peace and the rule of law. "6
46. This conclusion fully supports the recommendation of the U.N. Executive Committee on
Peace and Security Task Force for Development of Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategies for Peace
Operations (ECPS Task Force) that "the goal of all UN personnel working in the rule of law area should
be to reinforce the capacities of, and not replace, local actors whenever possible." See ECPS TASK
FORCE, FINAL REPORT 4 (2002).
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